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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the external debt cr~s~s of
Latin America and its impact on the economic development
of the area. The analysis covers four stages. First, it
will consider how the debt problem came to be what it is
now and the way in which it evolved into its present
circumstances. Second, it will address the reasons why
the industrial countries should worry about the debt
problems of the hemisphere. Third, it is also necessary
to examine what Latin America is doing to handle its debt
burden and its implication for the performance of its
economy. Fourth, some possible solutions to the defusing
of the remaining debt bombs, including those which have
not exploded yet, will be examined. Finally, we
emphasize the need to integrate the debt problem with the
whole developmental strategy of the area in such a way as
to promote compatibility between the policies designed to
handle both issues.
This paper considers the external (which perhaps
should be called the eternal) debt crisis of Latin
America. The presentation is going to cover four stages.
First, it will consider how the debt problem came to be
what it now is and the way in which it evolved into its
present circumstances. Second , it will address the
reasons why the developed countries should worry about
it. After all, why not allow the Latin Americans to stew
in their own handling of the foreign debt. Third, it is
necessary to examine what Latin America is doing to
handle its debt burden and its implication for the
performance of the Latin American economy. Fourth, some
possible solutions to the defusing of the remaining debt
bombs, those which have not exploded yet, will be
examined. It will be shown that, as long as there is no
chain reaction in the arsenal, the eternity of the
problem should arouse interest, but not deep concern.
The origin of the crisis which erupted in 1982, goes
back to what occurred in the world economy in the 1950's.
What happened then was the resumption of the trends that
had worked for successful growth before, particularly in
the period from the 1870's to the First World war. This
was a period in which the economies of th~ world were
most influenced by the international economy to whose
trend they adapted. However, after World War I, an
unrestful era began, which eventually erupted into the
crash of 1929. The period that followed the crash was
inimical to the international economy, whose health began
to recover after the Second World War as it grew toward
.the relative levels that were normal in the 1910' s.
Slowly at first, debt ratios began to build up. If one
looks at the Latin American debt indicators in the early
1960's, in that historical context, problems are seen
cropping up already which began, even then, to worry some
doomsayers.
However, the characteristics of the international
economy differed in the fifties and sixties from what it
had been at the turn of the century. Between 1950 and
1970, the developing countries became a major participant
in the world economy, something that was not the case
early in the century. Furthermore, an environment of
decontrol, deregulation, floating exchange rates and so
on, increasingly began to take hold. This was
illustrated by the emergence of an oil cartel of
developing countries, which wrested the control of this
crucial commodity from the major oil companies.
This set of circumstances eventually produced a
counter-reaction in the position of the U. S. and the
major countries of the West. They began to see that they
were losing their hegemony over the international economy
and, moreover, that the latter was affecting their
domestic economies in detrimental ways.
Led by the ideas expressed in the late 70's by Paul
Volcker (Chairman of the Federal Reserve System), the
national economy of the U."S. changed radically from 1980
on, putting a damper on the growth of the international
economy and on its inflationary creep. The other
industrial countries followed suit. In the end, a
dis inflationary mode set in the domestic and world
product and financial markets. These conditions brought
about a crisis in the world economy that we are still
experiencing to some degree at present.
On the second direction, why should the debt
problems of Latin America draw so much attention in the
West? Why not allow these countries to solve their own
problems? What payoffs can be expected by the developed
countries from their involvement in this issue? These
questions can be answered straightforwardly if they are
considered in the context of the actual and growing size
of these countries' economies. The gross domestic
product (GOP) of Latin America can be estimated at about
$994b. in 1993, which is not insignificant when compared
to the total of the world economy. The region's G.O.P.
increased by 4% in 1991, 3.1% in 1992 and 3.9% in 1993.
The lackluster performance of the Latin economies
eventuated in a 10% decline in the per capita income of
the area during the eighties. Preliminary indications
also reveal an average increase of about 1.5% in GOP per
capita for the 1990-93 period. Typically, the Latin
economies are relatively closed economies, particularly
when compared to those in the Pacific Basin, and even
relative to the European ones. Brazil, by far the
largest country in the group is an illustrative case,
with its trade balance in goods and services representing
only 3.75% of its G.O.P. in 1993. Latin America had
already achieved, by the mid-1980's, a market size very
close to that attained by the European Common Market in
the middle sixties. Thus, the region is the largest
untapped market for the products, investment, technology
and know~how of the West.
In 1990, the exports of goods and services from
Latin American countries amounted to $123.b. In 1991 the
total value of exports had decreased to $121b. The
corresponding figures for 1992 and 1993 were $126b. and
$132b., respectively. As is evident, the exports of the
region are not even keeping pace-with the increase in
population. Meanwhile, the overall regional debt is
approaching the $l,lOOb. mark, which exerts a strong
pressure on future export performance in order to meet
credit obligations.
Far more important than the past are the immediate
prospects of Latin America. By the year 2000, its
population is expected to be approaching 600 million
inhabitants, which is going to be more than twice the
population of the united States, and double that of the
European Community. By then, its GNP in 1985 prices will
probably be about $1.5 trillion. This large figure is
something the Western world cannot afford to ignore. On
the other hand, although the foreign debt will surpass
its present $534b. level by the end of the millennium, it
will not grow during this decade as fast as it did in the
1980-1989 period. Looking into the next century, Latin
America is certainly going to be one of the major blocks
in the world, rivalling the European community and the
Pacific Basin in economic importance and in keen interest
to the United states as a powerful neighbor.
Also, from a political perspective, it is important
to realize that, even though a mUltiplicity of v~ews
exist in the Southern Hemisphere, Latin America is
beginning to speak with one voice in economic issues,
often times adopting postures opposed to those of the
United states. In political terms, the Contadora group
emerged as a recent example of a coilaborative Latin
effort undertaken despite significant U.s •. reticence. On
another front, the cartagena Declaration Group on debt
matters, has continued to meet, pressing on a common
Latin American point of view. For all the above reasons,
the Latin American debt crisis has to be given policy
priority by the industrial countries as the Latin
American nations begin to play an increasingly important
role in the international stage.
As repeatedly stated, the decade of the eighties was
a most difficult period for Latin America. The annual
average growth rate of the Latin American economies for
that period was only 1.1%. By contrast, for 1990-1993
the annual average growth rate increased to 3.4%
expanding to 3.7% in 1994. As for the foreign sector,
growth in the region's exports has been modest for the
early years of the present decade. On the average,.
exports have risen by about $10b. annually for 1992 and
1993 relative to preceding years. This performance is
highly favorable if compared to events in 1986 when
exports declined by 15%--of which 10% was in terms of
lower prices and 5% in reduced quantities. As we know,
there was a relative improvement in the total value of
exports for the years 1987 and 1988. Altogether, the
cumulative loss of purchasing power 'of Latin American
exports relative to imports due to the behavior of the
terms of trade for goods has been approximately of -21.0
between 1981 and 1990 (1980=100).
As for the nineties, the value of exports went up by
3.6% in 1991, 8.B% in 1992 and 6.2% in 1993. Exports in
1994 reached $153b., a rise of over 14% relative to 1993.
However, imports to the region have also climbed to
$171b. in 1994, an increase of 15% compared to 1993. In
the latter year imports had expanded by B% in relation to
1992.
As a result, the deficit in the trade balance
experienced a 19% expansion in 1994, continuing the
tendency towards a widening current account deficit which
itself is financed by large inflows of capital from
abroad. Notice how that deficit has grown from $46b. in
1993 to $50b. in 1994, while capital inflows reached the
$65b. mark in 1993 and $57b. in 1994. The cumulative
current account deficit from 1987 to 1994 has amounted to
approximately $lB5b.
This means that Latin America is transferring
capital abroad. It uses part of its national savings to
payoff the interest and dividends that have to be
remitted abroad. Instead of the area being helped in its
process of development by capital infusion, just the
opposite has happened. Latin America has transferred
capital to the advanced countries to the tune of $180
billion during the period 19B7-1994, representing close
to 20% of its annual gross national product and
surpassing its yearly exports of gbods and services. Not
surprisingly I these trends were reflected in a
substantial decrease in the gross domestic investment
figures of the area from 1980 to 1990. In fact, the
average annual growth rate of gross domestic investment
during that period was -3%. A recovery of sorts has
occurred in 1990-1993, with a 7.2% annual growth rate
recorded for that index. Meanwhile, the regional debt
rose by close to 6% in 1994, reaching the figure of
$534b., slightly higher than 50% of the G.D.P. of the
region for that year. Meanwhile, the debt service ratio
stood at 40% for that same date, the second highest
figure since 1986.
It can be concluded from this brief analysis of how
Latin America has been recently evolving, that things are
not going well given the adverse circumstances faced by
these countries. The Latin American nations have been
practically cordoned off from foreign direct investment
(only $15b. in 1994), and their terms of trade have
continued to deteriorate. In light of the preceding, it
is surprising that the region is growing at all, and that
in fact it is more than covering its population growth,
which has been about 1.9% annually for the period 1990-
1993. The urgent need to resume per capita product
growth in the area, and its appropriateness in terms of
the foreign policy goals of the U.S. was finally
recognized in the Baker and Brady plans. The concepts of
growth with domestic and economic adjustment is a major
overall contribution to both the intellectual vision and
the policy approach to the debt crisis.
As to the formulation of definitive solutions to the
crisis, specific proposals have never seemed appropriate
thus far. Yet, there are general propositions that
should be considered as premises from which to derive
wide-ranging policy measures. First, acknowledge the
close and interdependent relationship between debt,
development and trade. Second, recognize that world
economic conditions; particularly those in commerce and
finance, are the principal exogenous determinant of the
degree of amelioration of the debt crunch. Nothing can
really help as much as a growing, healthy international
economy. Third, understand that policy coordination
among the leading economies in the world is essential.
After the number of attempts at economic summitry in the
last decade and a half, this appears to be now happening
for the first time. The Group of Five has been leading
the economic coordination efforts among the Western
economies. These have included monetary, fiscal and
exchange rate policies. In order to address the problem
at hand, it would appear that extending policy
coordination to diminishing protectionism on debt-ridden
country exports, and promoting acceptance of the
principle of sharing the burden of relief with developing
countries, are constructive and timely steps. Fourth,
from the Latin American point of view, it is important to
open the region's economies more to international trade.
A traditional lack of export orientation has been their
Achilles heel. for most of the Post-Was period. Latin
America has been losing its share in world exports during
this period and this has to change drastically,
particularly when it is realized that developing
countries are now important exporters of industrial
products.
Finally, the institutional way of handling the debt
problem has to be changed. This was partly proposed
already by the so called Baker Plan. Instead of the IMF,
the World Bank (lBRD) should now bear the brunt of a
revival in Latin American lending policy, through the
window of policy and structural loans change recently
opened by the IBRD. The short-term loan conditionality
which characterizes the fund, now becomes long-term under
the new conception. In the managing of the debt, the
private banks and the industrial countries' governments
cannot be far behind in supporting this novel approach.
This is a welcome financial and economic innovation
because it transforms the substance of the problem from
short term adjustment to long term growth. These two
objectives are incompatible and simply cannot be pursued
simultaneously in Latin America. The attempt to
reconcile them has already created many c~mplications in
the form of inconsistencies for decision makers down
there. The success of these developmental policies is
required if voluntary lending is ever to return from the
cold, buoyed by renewed confidence on the ability of
Latin America to service its debt through sustained
growth.
Once again, it is necessary to distinguish between
the amelioration of the debt problem and its solution.
Practically all of the measures adopted since the crisis
of 1982 fall in the former category. Rescheduling,
rollovers, emergency lending packages by international
institutions and private bankers, the conversion of debt
into equity or long term public bonds, the reduction of
interest rates, the adjustment of the outstanding debt
total to actual market values, payments in kind or in
currencies other than those in which obligations were
contracted, and other like measures, do not address the
central issue. Namely, the institution of a sustained
process of real wealth creation in the debtor countries.
This is the fundamental basis and necessary condition on
which any permanent resolution of the debt situation must
rest. The alternative to development can only be, .in the
end, the default of debt, wh~chcould hardly be regarded
as a satisfactory solution to all parties concerned.
Even the partial or total assumption of the principal by
international institutions, unlikely as it may be,
through the floating of negotiable documents, would not
constitute, properly speaking, a "solution", but rater a
salvaging operation beyond the normal.realmof economic
relations as presently defined in the 'international
system.
It is in the· above context that the early Brady
plan, whose particulars have not yet been fully specifi~d
(and probably will never be) may constitute a definite
advance beyond the type of ameliorative measures tried in
the past. Its central thrust is directed at the
reduction of the principal of the debt. It thus squarely
addresses the fundamental issue of the debt problem. By
reducing the weight of the debt burden itself, it frees
the debtors' resources permanently for developmental
purposes. In this sense, the plan constitutes a new
departure, a true qualitative change, in the approach to
the solution of the problem. Once again, a true and
lasting resolution of the debtor' s situation requires the
resumption of a high and sustained growth process. This,
in turn, depends on resources and efforts becoming
available to accomplish the task. The Brady plan signals
a beginning in the right direction.
We should stop for a moment to broadly consider the
criticisms leveled at the Brady plan by academics and
functionaries-. It has been said that it is not ambitious
enough in scope; that it has not been defined and
detailed as rigorously and minutely as it should; that it
works too slowly; that it is too lenient on the creditor
banks and excessively harsh on the debtor nations; that
the plan, in supporting the I.M.F., demands for LDC's to
adopt severe adjustment policies that indirectly promote
social and political instability in those countries; that
it does not succeed in motivating bankers to restart the
flow of fresh capital funds to accelerate the development
process in LDC's, especially in Latin America; that in
the end, it will not work because the guarantees given by
debtor countries will not hold in the absence of
sustained growth. All of this not to speak, on the other
side of the issue, about the cost to the u.s. taxpayers
of the various deals either completed or under
consideration. In short, many countries thing that the
Brady Plan is not well conceived to meet the needs of
developing countries and that, in a few words, it is a
classic example of a too little, too late, policy
measure.
Obviously, in evaluating the Brady Plan, we are
clearly facing a judgmental matter. One opinion with
regard to the panoply of objections raised against the
Plan will depend on our selection of criteria to measure
its success, and on the relative weight ascribed to its
different goals and objectives, as well as on the set of
restrictions and parameters bounding the Plan's operation
that we choose to allow for. Many outcomes are possible.
Therefore, a reasoned critique of the Brady Plan should
include information on the evaluative instruments and
__"",,""VJ,.ogy applied in reaching one's conclusions.
However, it should also be pointed out that even if these
requirements were to be fulfilled, they would not be
sufficient to establish a verifiable conclusion. the
reason being that a truly encompassing analysis of the
effects of the Plan would have to include an in-depth
study of the realistic alternatives to it and their
practical feasibility. Without examining the alternative
scenarios that may be obtained with a degree of
probability in the absence of the Plan, no truly
documented position could be taken on this issue.
Obviously, this is not the opportunity to undertake
such a laborious and highly technical task.
Consequently, we will limit ourselves to state,
admittedly based on our own impressionistic perception of
the very complex socio-economic and ideologico-political
situation characterizing not only Latin American in
general, but the developed and formerly socialistic block
countries as well, that the Brady Plan can be considered
a reasonably effective policy tool. This is not to say
that it cannot be improved upon which, without question,
it can. For example, bankers should be stimulated to
become more heavily involved in financing the medium and
long-term needs of· the region. Complementary trade
liberalization and promotion steps should be promptly
implemented in order to increase the commercial flow
between Latin America and the developed nations' markets.
The fine tuning and tailoring of the Brady Plan to the
specific needs and circumstances of each debtor nation
has to be further worked out. Also, much remains to be
done by way of integrating each modified or individual
version of the plan with the structural and functional
features of each nation's developmental blueprint.
Undoubtedly, the debt problem has served to
highlight the structural changes that have taken place in
the international political and economic systems in the
last four decades. The less developed countries are now
an integral part of those systems. Their function is no
longer a peripheral and subservient one. This means that
their economic and even social policies must dovetail
with those of the developed world. In the course of
time, these developments will inevitably lead to a
complete revamping of the international economic
institutions. Likewise, the domestic fiscal and monetary
policies of developed countries will have to strive for
greater consistency and harmony for the sake of attaining
mutually desired goals in the international arena. Less
obvious at this point in time but ultimately equally
unavoidable, will be the requirement of coordinating
these policies with the domestic and external needs and
functions of the less developed nations.
The institutional arrangements negotiated at Bretton
Woods are now clearly passe. Naturally, it will take
time for the full consciousness required for change to
take place, to emerge and solidify. Gradual modification
and evolution rather than wholesale restructuring will in
all probability prevail. but, in the end, a new
institutionalization of the international system, now
looming in the horizon, will come into its own. This new
order will not necessarily consist exclusively of new
organizations put, more importantlY, it will have to be
infused with a new spirit. That is, of a vivid
realization that growth in developed countries and
development in less advanced ones, international trade
and finance, exchange rates, commercial and investment
policies, along with domestic social and economic
programs, will have to be coordinated and made compatible
for the sake of stability and mutual prosperity.
In the above context, the so-called debt crisis may
be symptomatic of things to corne and a harbinger of the
new mentality and kind of perspective that seems destined
to gradually gain ground in the realm of international
affairs.
Just like historical evolution required the
constitution of a new network of institutions and
arrangements at the end of the Second World War, which
made viable sustained growth in developed countries and
growth through trade in poor ones, the present times
demand new changes and fresh views. The interdependence
of the world economy and policy has reach~d such a point,
that it is no longer possible to conduct a
compartmentalized, purely national or regional policy.
In our own days, the almost continuous negotiations among
industrialized countries, vide the Venice and Louvre
agreements, the pressure upon Japan for this nation to
liberalize its trade, the exhortations of Secretary Baker
for Germany to stimulate its economy, vouch for the
presence, in fact, of an international system quite
different from the one in existence forty years ago.
What does not seem quite so evident to many,
although in fact this is the case, is that the less
developed nations are already a part of this new reality.
In other words, compatibility, coherence and coordination
of goals and policies on the part of developed and less
developed nations is now an inescapable necessity if
crisis of one sort or another are to be avoided in the
future.
In closing, let it be repeated that the new
perspective on the solution of the Latin American debt
crisis, calls for the devising and adoption of a
comprehensive domestic and international set of policies
that will result in the reinvigorating of international
trade, investment and lending policies, along with the
resurgence of domestic savings and capital formation,
leading to the kind of growth rates in excess of 5%
annually that characterized the decades of the fifties,
sixties and seventies. This kind of performance,· if
brought back, would make of the external debt not a
burden and an unproductive dead-weight but, on the
contrary, as has been traditional in the history of
economic development, a lively sign of vigorous growth
and long-term expansion. The solution of' the debt
problem is for the debt not to be a ballast that impedes
growth but for the debt to become, through its role in
wealth creation, a stimulus and prod to growth. An
increasing debt can be a healthy sign of growth, just
like Adam smith in the Wealth of Nations said back in
1776 that increasing salaries were an indication of
growing wealth. On the contrary, a large and increasing
debt has no "solution" if it doesn't cease to be part of
the problem in order to become part of a true solution to
the economic problems of developed and underdeveloped
countries alike.
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